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Trojanized Claude Code extension on the Cursor marketplace: up to 5,000 users

Nov 17, 2026 · claude-code, cursor, supply-chain

TL;DR An access key Cursor had given an AI vendor leaked; attackers published altered extension builds (2.1.312 and 2.1.313) for about 11 hours.

In plain words: a password-like key leaked from a partner company. With it, attackers got into places they should not, found more keys inside saved AI-agent conversations, and used them to publish a fake update of a popular coding extension.

What happened

A key that Cursor had issued to an AI vendor (Fireworks) leaked. Attackers used it to copy agent transcripts that contained credentials, and then published versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 of the Claude Code extension on Cursor’s marketplace for about 11 hours (Oct 29), for macOS and Windows. The altered version installs an SSH key and a backdoor that survives uninstalling the extension.

Who is affected

Up to about 5,000 users who installed or auto-updated to 2.1.312 or 2.1.313 from Cursor’s marketplace during that window.

Why it matters

The chain started with a vendor key and went through agent transcripts. Transcripts are an underrated place where secrets pile up.

What to do

  1. Check ~/.ssh/authorized_keys for an entry named svc-telemetry.
  2. Install agent extensions only from the official channel.
  3. Treat agent transcripts as secrets, and revoke keys given to vendors once they are no longer needed.

Sources

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